

VIA: _____
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. EDNA-8985

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE

DATE: 8 June 1956

FROM : Chief of Base, Bonn *glo*

INFO: COS, Germany

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— Memorandum of Conversation with CAUSA on 7 June, 1956

1. I saw CAUSA by appointment on 7 June 1956 at 1600 hours, and passed to him for his personal files a photostatic copy of the 1941 letter by Martin Bormann rejecting his application for membership in the Nazi Party. I told him that this letter could not be published because the Berlin Documents Center knew that I had requested the photostatic copy. He appreciated the letter as a souvenir of the complicated past.

2. I stated to him that we had no great problems to bring up at the present moment, and that our various intelligence and security arrangements were proceeding as well as could be expected although sometimes the pace seemed to be rather slow. He pointed out that the Nazi period had left the impressions of a police state on the minds of many and that there was great opposition on the part principally of journalists and industrialists to anything that smacked of spying upon the citizen or subjecting him to investigations. This journalistic opposition, difficulties with the Economics Ministry, and Bundestag opposition centered around Bucerius accounted for the delay in implementing some of the programs in which we were interested. Progress was being made but the slow rate was, he hoped, understandable.

3. CAUSA explained at some length arrangements that had been made under the auspices of the Bundeskanzleramt to insure the passage of the military service law before the summer dissolution of the Bundestag. This conversation has been reported in a positive intelligence report.

4. CAUSA stated that Soviet Ambassador Zorin had an appointment with Chancellor Adenauer at 1615. We speculated as to what might be the reason for the appointment. CAUSA stated that he had a suspicion, based on a confidential report, that Zorin, who had called and stated that he had an important message to pass to the Chancellor, was attempting, as CAUSA said, to "lay a cuckoo's egg in the nest" on the eve of Adenauer's trip to the United States. This suspicion may be reinforced

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2006

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

-2-

by the news that they have that the Supreme Soviet has called a meeting for June 13 and it is suspected that the Supreme Soviet may come out with some startling announcement designed to upset the Adenauer-Eisenhower talks in Washington. CAUSA promised to call me later in case the Zorin-Adenauer conversation contained something that should be passed through our channels to Washington. Zorin was late for his appointment. As I was leaving at 1630, his car was just drawing up to the door. (CAUSA called the following morning - 8 June - to report that Zorin had called on the Chancellor to announce their most recent disarmament proposal to President Eisenhower).

Distribution:

3-EE

2-COS

SECRET

THIS IS A REPRODUCIBLE COPY